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I. INTRODUCTION 
On August 7, 2010, three men brandishing guns entered a pizzeria in 
South Florida and demanded cash from an employee.1  About a month later, 
* Stephanie Carlton is a J.D. candidate for May 2016 at Nova Southeastern
University, Shepard Broad College of Law. Stephanie would like to extend a thank you to her 
colleagues at the Nova Law Review for their hard work to improve and refine this article. She 
would also like to thank her mother and father who have endlessly supported her throughout 
her law school journey. 
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the same group ran into a car parts store and forced an employee at gunpoint 
to unlock the safe.2  When the employee scrambled to open the safe, the 
armed men screamed in the employee’s face, threatening to kill him.3  
“Eventually, when the safe did not open, [the robbers] fled.”4  As he fled 
with his accomplices, Davis shot at a dog that was merely barking at them.5 
The group of robbers, in a two-month span, terrorized the South 
Florida community by committing a series of seven armed robberies.6  
Eventually, surveillance video, DNA, and cell site location information 
(“CSLI”) enabled the police to catch the violent group.7  Notably, 
“[h]istorical [CSLI] showed that Davis and his accomplices had placed and 
received cell phone calls in close proximity to the locations of the crimes 
around the times that the crimes were committed.”8  Obtaining historical 
CSLI, and the use of it as evidence during Davis’s trial, became a 
controversial issue during Davis’s appeal.9  The governmental obtainment of 
historical CSLI with a court order rather than a warrant has created a Fourth 
Amendment debate.10  Should the government be required to demonstrate 
probable cause to secure a warrant to obtain historical CSLI?11  Although 
this modern constitutional debate has been considered in other circuits, 
United States v. Davis12 raises an issue of first impression in the Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals.13 
This Comment analyzes the prevailing controversy surrounding 
technology, government, and privacy.14  It begins by exploring the elements 
of the Fourth Amendment and the predominant cases dealing with privacy 
such as Katz v. United States.15  Part two discusses what constitutes a search 
under the Fourth Amendment and presages the discussion of why obtaining 
                                                                                                       
1. Brief for the United States at 5, United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205 
(11th Cir. 2014) (No. 12-12928-EE). 
2. Id. at 6–7. 
3. Id. at 7. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. See Brief for the United States, supra note 1, at 4–9. 
7. See id. at 9–10. 
8. Id. at 10. 
9. See United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1211 (11th Cir.), reh’g granted 
en banc, 573 F. App’x 925 (11th Cir. 2014). 
10. See id. 
11. See id. 
12. 754 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir.), reh’g granted en banc, 573 F. App’x 925 (11th 
Cir. 2014). 
13. Id. at 1210. 
14. See infra Parts II–V. 
15. 389 U.S. 347 (1967); see infra Part II. 
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historical CSLI does not constitute a search that will be discussed in the latter 
part of the Comment.16 
Part three of this Comment discusses historical CSLI and this non-
invasive law enforcement practice.17  This section elaborates on the 
difference between historical and real-time CSLI while explaining why 
historical CSLI is non-invasive and does not constitute a search within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.18 
Part four—the largest and most significant part—focuses on the 
recent Eleventh Circuit decision of Davis.19  This section contains an in-
depth critique of the opinion.20  Additionally, it explains the mistake the 
Eleventh Circuit made in comparing the case at hand to United States v. 
Jones.21  This Part then discusses other weaknesses of the opinion and 
explains how and why the court’s decision was misguided.22 
The purpose of this Comment is to educate the public on the 
misinterpretation of the Fourth Amendment and to explain why one does not 
have an expectation of privacy in public.23  Lastly, this Comment analyzes 
the recent Eleventh Circuit decision and discusses why the court got it wrong 
when it comes to Fourth Amendment implications and historical CSLI.24 
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT OVERVIEW 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution warrants 
“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”25  The Fourth 
Amendment is designed to protect the privacy of individuals from unlawful 
intrusion by the government.26  An individual must have a “‘constitutionally 
protected reasonable expectation of privacy’” in order to obtain protection 
                                            
16. See infra Part II.A. 
17. See infra Part III. 
18. See infra Part III. 
19. United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1223 (11th Cir.), reh’g granted en 
banc, 573 F. App’x 925 (11th Cir. 2014); see infra Part IV. 
20. See infra Part IV. 
21. No. 10-1259, slip op. 1 (U.S. Jan. 23, 2012); see infra Part IV. 
22. See infra Part IV. 
23. See United States v. Shanks, 97 F.3d 977, 980 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding 
defendant lacked legitimate expectation of privacy when he left garbage bags filled with 
contraband next to the street). 
24. See infra Parts II–IV. 
25. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
26. Kyle Malone, Comment, The Fourth Amendment and the Stored 
Communications Act:  Why the Warrantless Gathering of Historical Cell Site Location 
Information Poses No Threat to Privacy, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 701, 712 (2012). 
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under the Fourth Amendment from an unreasonable search or seizure.27  To 
determine whether an individual’s expectation of privacy is reasonable the 
Court in Katz developed a two-part test.28  The first part of the test involves 
whether “the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the 
object of the challenged search.”29  The second part of the test asks whether 
“society [is] willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable.”30  The 
reasonable expectation of privacy, however, does not extend to what an 
individual consciously reveals to the public.31  Furthermore, the expectation 
of privacy, construed from the Fourth Amendment, is determined by the 
context of each case.32 
A. What Constitutes a Search? 
 To determine whether the government has performed an 
unreasonable search protected under the Fourth Amendment, one must 
determine whether that person exhibits an actual or subjective expectation of 
privacy which society is ready to accept as reasonable.33  If no expectation of 
privacy exists then a search without a warrant does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.34  If, however, a person does have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, the government cannot seize evidence without a warrant supported 
by probable cause.35 
A person does not have a subjective expectation of privacy to what 
he or she exposes to the public.36  When “a person knowingly exposes 
[information] to the public,” he or she can no longer subjectively believe that 
information will be kept private, and therefore will not benefit from Fourth 
Amendment protections.37 
                                            
27. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (quoting Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
28. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
29. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211; see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., 
concurring). 
30. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211; see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., 
concurring). 
31. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
32. Malone, supra note 26, at 712. 
33. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
34. See id. 
35. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
36. See United States v. Shanks, 97 F.3d 977, 980 (7th Cir. 1996). 
37. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
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III. FOURTH AMENDMENT AND CELL PHONE TECHNOLOGY 
There are roughly three hundred million cell phone subscribers in the 
United States alone.38  Notwithstanding the country’s growing affinity with 
technology, a lack of appellant precedent exists regarding what the 
government can and cannot obtain from technological devices, such as cell 
phones.39  It is important to understand how a cell phone works in order to 
evaluate the few cases available regarding CSLI and to help predict future 
decisions.40 
When a person places a cell phone call, a signal is conveyed to the 
nearest cell tower, and eventually to the carrier’s office.41  What experts refer 
to as a cell site is the “geographical location containing the cell tower, radio 
transceiver, and base station controller.”42  Anytime a person receives or 
makes a cell phone call, the carrier stores that information.43  It should be 
noted that even when a cell phone user is not placing a call, his or her 
location can be identified because the phone is continuously interacting with 
the mobile network.44  According to many scholars, due to the sophistication 
of mobile devices, CSLI can be obtained within a few hundred feet.45 
A. Cell Site Location Information (“CSLI”) 
What is typically referred to as CSLI has become a widely used 
method for the government to help fight crime.46  Although it has recently 
been used to combat criminal activity, many fear that obtainment of this 
information infringes on a person’s Fourth Amendment rights.47  Courts 
frequently differentiate between historical CSLI and real-time CSLI, also 
                                            
38. See CTIA-THE WIRELESS ASS’N, CTIA’S Wireless Industry Survey 
Results, (2013), http://files.ctia.org/pdf/CTIA_Survey_YE_2012_Graphics-FINAL.pdf. 
39. Susan Freiwald, Cell Phone Location Data and the Fourth Amendment:  A 
Question of Law, Not Fact, 70 MD. L. REV. 681, 681 (2011). 
40. See United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1210 (11th Cir.), reh’g granted 
en banc, 573 F. App’x 925 (11th Cir. 2014) (stating that “Davis’s Fourth Amendment 
argument raises issues of first impression in this circuit, and not definitively decided 
elsewhere in the country”); Malone, supra note 26, at 703 (stating that “many people probably 
do not consider how this technology works or what information they may inadvertently be 
sharing with their cell phone company”). 
41. Malone, supra note 26, at 707–08. 
42. Christopher Fox, Comment, Checking In:  Historic Cell Site Location 
Information and the Stored Communications Act, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 769, 773–74 (2012). 
43. See id. 
44. Malone, supra note 26, at 708. 
45. Id. at 704. 
46. Id. 
47. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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known as prospective CSLI.48  This distinction between real-time and 
historical CSLI is vital in the evaluation and response to privacy issues.49  
Courts have yet to sufficiently address whether CSLI deserves any 
constitutional protection at all.50  The major issue facing CSLI among legal 
scholars is whether a warrant should be required to obtain historical CSLI.51  
Before one can obtain a warrant, probable cause must be established.52  Even 
before one can delve into this complex constitutional issue, two questions 
must be answered.53  The first question is whether collecting CSLI is 
considered a search; if it is considered a search, then there must be 
compliance with the Fourth Amendment.54  Second, if obtaining CSLI is not 
considered a search, then what standard must the government meet in order 
to obtain historical CSLI?55 
1. Historical Versus Real-Time Location Information 
Historical CSLI records are obtained from a past date in time and 
only provide “the date, time, and duration of calls, whether calls are inbound 
or outbound, and show the originating and terminating cell sites for calls 
received or placed on the phone.”56  Cell phone carriers retain this 
information for a given amount of time for business purposes.57  Real-time 
CSLI permits the government in present time to track a cell phone user’s 
whereabouts.58  The majority of courts faced with requests for real-time 
CSLI consistently have held the material is considered “tracking information 
as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 3117, which requires a warrant—and thus a 
showing of probable cause—before an order for disclosure of that CSLI may 
                                            
48. Malone, supra note 26, at 704. 
49. Steven M. Harkins, Note, CSLI Disclosure:  Why Probable Cause Is 
Necessary to Protect What’s Left of the Fourth Amendment, 68 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 1875, 
1884 (2011). 
50. Malone, supra note 26, at 704. 
51. Id. at 704–05. 
52. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure . . . 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause . . . .”). 
53. Harkins, supra note 49, at 1887. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Aaron Blank, The Limitations and Admissibility of Using Historical 
Cellular Site Data to Track the Location of a Cellular Phone, RICH. J.L. & TECH., Fall 2011, 
at 1, 10. 
57. Scott A. Fraser, Comment, Making Sense of New Technologies and Old 
Law:  A New Proposal for Historical Cell-Site Location Jurisprudence, 52 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 571, 579–80 (2012). 
58. See id. at 582. 
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be granted.”59  The real debate, however, regarding CSLI concerns historical 
data, as seen in Davis.60  Courts have interpreted historical CSLI to be 
overseen by section 201 of the Stored Communications Act.61 
a. The Stored Communications Act 
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 oversees the 
discovery of CSLI.62  The Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
encompasses the Stored Communications Act in title two and “serve[s] as the 
basic statutory framework within which CSLI jurisprudence has 
developed.”63  Congress passed the Stored Communications Act to combat 
privacy concerns regarding the voluntary obtainment of consumers’ personal 
information.64  Under the Stored Communications Act, the government 
cannot simply compel communication companies, specifically cell phone 
companies, to turn over private customer information such as telephone 
numbers and call logs.65  In addition, the communication companies are 
similarly constricted in their ability to turn over customer information to the 
government.66 
Under the Stored Communications Act, a government agency may 
compel a communication service provider to provide the “contents of a wire 
or electronic communication, that is in electronic storage in an electronic 
communications system for one hundred and eighty days or less, only 
pursuant to a warrant.”67  Under section 201 of the Stored Communications 
Act, the government may therefore obtain the actual location of a cell phone 
subscriber in real time only when the government agency obtains a warrant 
                                            
59. Malone, supra note 26, at 710; see also Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act of 1986 § 108, 18 U.S.C. § 3117 (2012). 
60. United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1210–11 (11th Cir.), reh’g granted 
en banc, 573 F. App’x 925 (11th. Cir. 2014); Malone, supra note 26, at 710–11. 
61. Stored Communications Privacy Act of 1986 § 201, 18 U.S.C. § 2703 
(2012); Davis, 754 F.3d at 1210–11; In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a 
Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 307–08 (3d 
Cir. 2010); Malone, supra note 26, at 710. 
62. Harkins, supra note 49, at 1894.  See generally Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 § 101, 18 U.S.C. § 2510. 
63. Harkins, supra note 49, at 1894; see also Stored Communications Act § 
201. 
64. See Harkins, supra note 49, at 1899. 
65. Harkins, supra note 49 at 1896; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a).  “The SCA 
regulates government access to stored user account information compiled by third parties in 
the ordinary course of business.”  Harkins, supra note 49, at 1896. 
66. Blank, supra note 56, at 11. 
67. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a); Malone, supra note 26, at 718. 
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pursuant to probable cause.68  While § 2703(a) only allows the government 
to obtain real-time location information pursuant to a warrant, § 2703(c) 
permits the government to obtain historical location information.69  To obtain 
historical information, 
[a] governmental entity may require a provider of electronic 
communication service or remote computing service to disclose a 
record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or 
customer of such service . . . only when the governmental entity:  
(A) obtains a warrant issued using the procedures described in the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; . . . (B) obtains a court order 
for such disclosure; [or] . . . (D) submits a formal written request 
relevant to a law enforcement investigation . . . .70 
Accordingly, the government, pursuant to § 2703(c), may obtain 
records of cell phone subscribers with a court order by following § 2703(d) 
of the codified Stored Communications Act.71 
The Stored Communications Act, section 201, sets forth the 
requirements needed for a government agency to obtain a court order, which 
would compel a carrier to turn over the information of a subscriber.72  This 
subsection of the statute allows the government to obtain the location 
information “only if the governmental entity offers specific and articulable 
facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents 
of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information 
sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”73 
Although most scholars and courts acknowledge that “a record or 
other information pertaining to a subscriber”74 refers to historical CSLI, the 
central dispute involves what standard should be employed by courts to 
                                            
68. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a).  According to the Act, a 
government agency may obtain the actual location of a subscriber’s communications only 
when the agency obtains a warrant pursuant to probable cause required by the Fourth 
Amendment.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV; 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a). 
69. U.S. CONST. amend IV; 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(a), (c). 
70. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1). 
In order for historical CSLI to be available under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1), three 
qualifications must be met:  [F]irst, the CSP must be a provider of an electronic 
communication service; second, the data may not be content information as defined 
in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8); and third, the data must be a “record or other information 
pertaining to a subscriber to or customer of” an electronic communications service. 
Fraser, supra note 57, at 583 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)); see also Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 § 101, 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (2012). 
71. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(c)–(d); Fraser, supra note 57, at 585. 
72. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). 
73. Id. 
74. Id. § 2703(c)(1). 
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authorize disclosure of historical CSLI.75  “Over the last several years, the 
prevailing view among the courts was that historical CSLI was governed by 
the S[tored] C[ommunications] A[ct] and thus could be obtained without a 
warrant pursuant to an 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) order.”76 
Conversely, many argue that a cell phone is really a tracking device 
and thus outside the scope of the Stored Communications Act since a 
tracking device is not within its definition of what is considered an electronic 
communication.77  Therefore, in order for the government to compel a carrier 
to provide historical CSLI of a subscriber, “the information must have been 
stored by [a provider of electronic communications].”78  The Third Circuit, 
however, has specifically addressed this issue and determined that a cell 
phone is not considered a tracking device.79 
b. Third Circuit Opinion 
In its holding, the Third Circuit articulated that by its nature, CSLI is 
not considered a tracking device and therefore should not be held to the 
higher probable cause standard.80  The Third Circuit decision was the first on 
the appellate level that decided “whether a court can deny a [g]overnment 
application under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) after the [g]overnment has satisfied its 
burden of proof under that provision.”81  The government in In re 
Application of the United States for an Order Directing a Provider of 
Electronic Communication Service to Disclose Records to the Government82 
submitted a request to the magistrate judge for a court order to obtain 
                                            
75. In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. 
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 307–08 (3d Cir. 2010). 
76. Malone, supra note 26, at 721; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). 
77. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 § 101, 18 U.S.C. § 
2510(12) (2012); Malone, supra note 26, at 724. 
78. Malone, supra note 26, at 724. 
79. In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. 
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d at 309, 313. 
80. Id. at 313. 
We therefore cannot accept the MJ’s conclusion that CSLI by definition should be 
considered information from a tracking device that, for that reason, requires 
probable cause for its production. 
In sum, we hold that CSLI from cell phone calls is obtainable under § 
2703(d) order and that such an order does not require the traditional probable cause 
determination. . . . The MJ erred in allowing her impressions of the general 
expectation of privacy of citizens to transform that standard into anything else.  We 
also conclude that this standard is a lesser one than probable cause, a conclusion 
that . . . is supported by the legislative history. 
Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). 
81. In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. 
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d at 305–06. 
82. 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010). 
9
Carlton: Why The Eleventh Circuit Got It Wrong: Historical Cell Site Locat
Published by NSUWorks, 2017
248 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
historical CSLI.83  The magistrate judge denied the government’s request and 
insisted on a government showing of probable cause when obtaining CSLI.84  
The Third Circuit, however, disagreed with the magistrate’s ruling and held 
“that CSLI from cell phone calls is obtainable under a [court] order and that 
such an order does not require the traditional probable cause 
determination.”85 
Notwithstanding the Third Circuit decision, some still believe that a 
cell phone is considered a tracking device when the government is 
attempting to obtain real-time or prospective data.86  Although many scholars 
support this contention, this Comment from here on focuses solely on 
historical CSLI.87 
Even though government agencies frequently use historical CSLI to 
investigate criminal activity throughout the country,88 a few scholars and 
courts believe section 2703(d) should be discarded and replaced with a newer 
and higher standard of probable cause.89  The Third Circuit, however, has 
held that to determine what standard a court should employ when a 
government agency attempts to obtain historical CSLI is not an issue for the 
courts to decide, and that the standard should, instead, be left up to 
Congress.90 
We respectfully suggest that if Congress intended to circumscribe 
the discretion it gave to magistrates under § 2703(d) then 
Congress, as the representative of the people, would have so 
provided.  Congress would, of course, be aware that such a statute 
mandating the issuance of a § 2703(d) order without requiring 
probable cause and based only on the Government’s word may 
evoke protests by cell phone users concerned about their privacy.  
The considerations for and against such a requirement would be 
for Congress to balance.  A court is not the appropriate forum for 
                                            
83. Id. at 305. 
84. Id. at 305, 308. 
85. Id. at 313.  “We also conclude that this standard is a lesser one than 
probable cause, a conclusion that . . . is supported by the legislative history.”  Id. 
86. Malone, supra note 26, at 724–25. 
87. E.g., id., at 724–25; see infra Parts III–V. 
88. See Malone, supra note 26, at 724. 
89. See In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. 
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 307–08 (3d Cir. 2010); 
Malone, supra note 26, 704–05. 
90. In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. 
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d at 319. 
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such balancing, and we decline to take a step to which Congress is 
silent.91 
This precedent-setting decision offered by the Third Circuit—while 
one of the first federal circuit court decisions regarding historical CSLI—
most likely will determine how future courts will examine the governmental 
obtainment of historical CSLI.92 
IV. UNITED STATES V. DAVIS:  WHY THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT GOT IT 
WRONG 
The next section of this Comment focuses on the misguided decision 
of the Eleventh Circuit in Davis.93  This section will provide evidence 
showing why the court was misguided.94 
A. No Reasonable Expectation of Privacy:  Third Party Doctrine 
Although the Eleventh Circuit claims that a cell phone subscriber has 
a subjective expectation of privacy, this expectation of privacy may not be 
one that society is willing to accept as reasonable.95  The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly articulated that Fourth Amendment protection does not extend to 
the information a person voluntarily reveals to a third party.96  Accordingly, 
if historical CSLI is considered to be information that is voluntarily given to 
a third party, then it is presumed that the government obtainment of historical 
CSLI is not considered a search and no warrant is required.97  To support this 
argument, many opponents of a warrant requirement standard cite to the 
Court’s ruling in United States v. Miller.98 
In Miller, the Supreme Court held that a person has no legitimate 
expectation of privacy to the voluntary information provided to a bank.99  
Before his trial, the respondent sought to suppress bank records obtained 
                                            
91. Id. 
92. Malone, supra note 26, at 723. 
93. See United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1223 (11th Cir.), reh’g granted 
en banc, 573 F. App’x 925 (11th. Cir. 2014); infra Part IV.A–E. 
94. See infra Part IV.A–E. 
95. Malone, supra note 26, at 712, 733. 
96. Jeremy H. Rothstein, Note, Track Me Maybe:  The Fourth Amendment 
and the Use of Cell Phone Tracking to Facilitate Arrest, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 506 
(2012). 
97. Id. 
98. 425 U.S. 435, 445–46 (1976); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 
743–44 (1979). 
99. Miller, 425 U.S. at 444–45. 
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through a purportedly flawed subpoena.100  The lower court denied his 
motion and respondent was subsequently convicted on conspiracy charges.101  
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed, but the Supreme Court later affirmed 
the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress.102  Additionally, in its 
decision, the Supreme Court reasoned that when a person conveys personal 
information to a third party, that person anticipates that the third party will 
inevitably convey that personal information to the government.103 
The checks are not confidential communications but negotiable 
instruments to be used in commercial transactions.  All of the 
documents obtained, including financial statements and deposit 
slips, contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks 
and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business.  
The lack of any legitimate expectation of privacy concerning the 
information kept in bank records was assumed by Congress . . . the 
expressed purpose of which . . . to require records to be maintained 
because they [are useful] “in criminal . . . investigations and 
proceedings.”104 
Banks retain a record of their customers’ accounts to comply with 
the Bank Secrecy Act, which is “merely an attempt to facilitate the use of a 
proper and longstanding law enforcement technique by insuring that records 
are available when they are needed.”105  The Court concluded that because 
customers are aware that the information within their account is kept by the 
bank—a third party—there is no Fourth Amendment right violated when that 
information is conveyed to law enforcement.106 
In addition to citing Miller, challengers to the warrant requirement 
standard for historical CSLI also cite the Court’s decision in Smith v. 
Maryland107 to bolster their argument.108  In that case the Court held—three 
years after Miller—that a person does not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy to the telephone numbers they dialed.109  In Smith, the government 
obtained an installation of a pen register on the petitioner’s phone to collect 
                                            
100. Id. at 436. 
101. Id. at 436–37. 
102. Id. at 437, 440. 
103. Rothstein, supra note 96, at 507 (citing Miller, 425 U.S. at 443). 
104. Miller, 425 U.S. at 442–43 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(a)(1) (1976)). 
105. Id. at 444. 
106. Id. at 444–45. 
107. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
108. See id. at 745–46 (1979); Miller, 425 U.S. at 446; In re Application of 
U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the 
Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 317 (3d Cir. 2010). 
109. Smith, 442 U.S. at 745. 
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the phone numbers he dialed.110  The police installed the pen register on the 
petitioner’s phone without obtaining a warrant or court order.111  The 
petitioner was suspected of participating in a robbery and subsequently 
making harassing phone calls to his victim.112  With the help of the pen 
register, the police were able to identify the petitioner as the robbery 
suspect.113  The victim was ultimately able to identify her robber, and 
thereafter, the petitioner was arrested.114  Prior to his trial, the petitioner 
sought to suppress all evidence obtained from the pen register on the 
contention it violated his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable 
search and seizure.115  The lower court ultimately denied the petitioner’s 
motion to suppress and the appeal went all the way to the Supreme Court.116  
Eventually, the Supreme Court held that because the information is 
voluntarily conveyed to a third party, a person does not have a subjective 
expectation of privacy to the phone numbers he or she dials.117  In addition, 
most people are aware that the carrier retains a record of the numbers dialed 
because they eventually appear on a monthly telephone bill.118 
Telephone users, in sum, typically know that they must convey 
numerical information to the phone company; that the phone 
company has facilities for recording this information; and that the 
phone company does in fact record this information for a variety of 
legitimate business purposes.  Although subjective expectations 
cannot be scientifically gauged, it is too much to believe that 
telephone subscribers, under these circumstances, harbor any 
general expectation that the numbers they dial will remain 
secret.119 
The petitioner attempted to argue that he had a legitimate 
expectation of privacy because the telephone calls originated in his house.120  
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court quickly shut down this argument by stating 
“[r]egardless of his location, petitioner had to convey that number to the 
                                            
110. Id. at 737. 
111. Id. 
112. See id. 
113. Id. 
114. Smith, 442 U.S. at 737. 
115. Id. at 737–38. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 743–44; see also Fraser, supra note 57, at 588.  “Further, in Smith v. 
Maryland, the Supreme Court found that the user of a telephone had voluntarily conveyed 
records of telephone numbers dialed when calls were made, and therefore assumed the risk 
that those records would be revealed to the police.”  Fraser, supra note 57, at 588. 
118. Smith, 442 U.S. at 742. 
119. Id. at 743. 
120. Id. 
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telephone company in . . . the same way if he wished to complete his call.  
The fact that he dialed the number on his home phone rather than on some 
other phone could make no conceivable difference . . . .”121  Even if he had 
an expectation of privacy to his dialed telephone numbers, the Supreme 
Court further noted that society is not willing to acknowledge this 
expectation of privacy as reasonable.122 
B. Historical CSLI:  A Voluntary Disclosure to a Third Party 
The underlying policy argument in both Miller and Smith is 
identical:  When a person voluntarily reveals information to a third party 
they surrender any legitimate expectation of privacy over that information.123  
Courts have extended the third party argument to comprise information 
regarding:  “[C]redit card statements, electric utility records, motel 
registration records, and employment records.”124  Proponents of a warrant 
requirement, however, challenge this line of reasoning and contend “cell 
phones automatically register with cell phone towers and send location 
information without any voluntary action by the user.”125  Although this may 
be the case, the automatic registration of a cell phone with a tower is an 
acknowledged consequence of possessing a cell phone.126 
Moreover, cell phone subscribers who simply pay their 
monthly bills without looking at them and who do not have GPS 
functions on their phones are still likely to know that the 
government uses such techniques due to the high-profile crimes 
that law enforcement agencies have reported and solved with the 
help of CSLI.127 
The Third Circuit, however, attempted to argue that a typical cell 
phone user likely does not even realize that a carrier retains their location 
                                            
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44; United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 
(1976); see also United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 399 (D. Md. 2012).  
“Historical CSLI has been analogized with other types of personal records, such as bank 
records, that courts have ruled are [freely given] to a third party.”  Malone, supra note 26, at 
739. 
124. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 399. 
125. Malone, supra note 26, at 739. 
126. Id. 
127. Fox, supra note 42, at 789. 
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information.128  However, this argument can easily be invalidated.129  When a 
cell phone user places a call, the user must undoubtedly anticipate that their 
carrier will determine their call location for billing purposes.130  How would 
a carrier determine the proper billing rate for a cell phone call without 
determining the subscriber’s location when making the call?131  Therefore, a 
subscriber must recognize that their cell phone provider retains their location 
information as part of the ordinary course of business.132 
An additional argument for why historical CSLI is considered a 
voluntary conveyance of information is because a cell phone user can easily 
turn off their phone, thereby preventing the registration of their location with 
a cell tower.133  In addition, most cell phone thieves immediately turn off the 
stolen phone because they understand that their location will likely be 
traceable.134  “[T]he prevalence of cell phones with GPS functions and 
subscribers’ increased use of these services directly undermine the position 
that cell phone customers are not voluntarily sharing their location 
information with [cell site providers].”135 
1. Comparison to United States v. Davis 
Similar to the telephone numbers dialed in Smith,136 and the bank 
information provided to the bank in Miller,137 the defendant in Davis 
                                            
128. In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. 
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 317 (3d Cir. 2010); Malone, 
supra note 26, at 739. 
129. See Malone, supra note 26, at 739. 
130. Id. at 739–40. 
131. See id. 
[A]s users become more aware of cell phone technology, there will no longer be a 
widespread lack of knowledge regarding the type of location data cell phone 
companies routinely collect.  If people continue to use their cell phones even after 
they learn and understand how historical CSLI is gathered and maintained, they 
will have a much harder time arguing that the CSLI has not been voluntarily 
conveyed. 
Id. at 740. 
132. Id. at 739–40. 
133. Malone, supra note 26, at 740. 
134. Garth Johnston, Smart Thieves Wise Up to Smart Phones:  Turn ‘Em Off 
to Disable Tracking, GOTHAMIST (March 26, 2012, 12:01 PM), http://gothamist.com/2012/
03/26/smart_crooks_wise_up_on_smart_phone.php. 
135. Fox, supra note 42, at 788. 
Therefore, a cell phone user has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the CSLI 
that the [cell site provider] records when the user makes or receives a call because 
the subscriber has voluntarily shared this information with the [cell site provider] 
and assumes the risk that the [cell site provider] may turn the information over to 
law enforcement agencies. 
Id. at 788–89. 
136. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979). 
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voluntarily transmitted his location to cell towers in order to make and 
receive calls.138  The carrier then retained the location information of the 
defendant for its personal business records.139  “[H]istorical [CSLI] are 
records created and kept by third parties that are voluntarily conveyed to 
those third parties by their customers.  As part of the ordinary course of 
business, cell[] phone companies collect information that identifies the cell[] 
towers through which a person’s calls are routed.”140 
C. The Beeper Cases 
Soon after the decisions of United States v. Knotts141 and United 
States v. Karo,142 the Supreme Court decided two cases within a two-term 
period that addressed the issue of governmental use of tracking devices in 
determining the whereabouts of suspected drug manufacturers.143  These two 
cases assist in determining whether a person has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy to his or her precise location.144  Additionally, “[t]hese cases are 
especially apt when discussing historical CSLI because they dealt with a 
technology that many critics of the current interpretation of the SCA 
compare to cell phones:  [T]racking devices.”145 
Employing the use of beepers allows law enforcement 
agents to track the object the beeper has been attached to by 
following the emitted signals, similar to the way in which one can 
compute historic CSLI to create a general picture of the 
movements of a cell phone, but with greater accuracy and in real-
time.146 
In Knotts, law enforcement agents positioned a tracking beeper in a 
container that was holding chloroform that agents suspected was used by the 
defendants in their production of drugs.147  Law enforcement agents were 
able to track the container to a remote cabin.148  With the assistance of the 
                                                                                                       
137. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 444–45 (1976). 
138. United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1209–10, 1216 (11th Cir.), reh’g 
granted en banc, 573 F. App’x 925 (11th Cir. 2014). 
139. Id. at 1209–10. 
140. United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 400 (D. Md. 2012). 
141. 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
142. 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
143. Fox, supra note 42, at 780. 
144. Malone, supra note 26, at 713. 
145. Id. 
146. Fox, supra note 42, at 780 (footnote omitted). 
147. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983). 
148. Id. 
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beeper and surveillance of the defendant’s cabin, the agents were able to 
obtain a search warrant.149  During the execution of the search warrant, 
agents discovered a drug laboratory and subsequently arrested the 
defendant.150  The defendant sought to suppress the evidence law 
enforcement obtained through the warrantless tracking of the beeper.151  
After his motion to suppress was denied, the defendant was convicted and 
sentenced for producing a controlled substance.152 
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the defendant’s conviction 
and found the use of the beeper to track the defendant was a violation of his 
Fourth Amendment rights.153  The Supreme Court, however, reversed the 
Eighth Circuit’s decision and found the defendant’s expectation of privacy 
was not violated because the warrantless tracking of the beeper was not a 
search within the Fourth Amendment.154  The Court reasoned that “[t]he 
governmental surveillance conducted by means of the beeper . . . amounted 
principally to the following of an automobile on public streets and 
highways.”155  Additionally, the Court noted that a person has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy when traveling in a car on a public road because that 
person voluntarily conveys that information to the public.156  The Court 
therefore once again concluded that a person cannot have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy to what is voluntarily conveyed to the public.157 
A similar fact pattern involving a beeper occurred in Karo.158  After 
the defendants purchased cans of ether from a confidential informant that 
were used in the extraction of cocaine from clothes that had been imported 
into the United States, the government secured a warrant that allowed the 
installation and tracking of a beeper in one of the cans.159  Once the 
defendant picked the cans of ether up from the informant, the agents then 
followed the defendant to his home.160  After the cans were moved to a 
                                            
149. Id. at 279. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. 
152. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 279. 
153. Id. at 279. 
154. Id. at 285. 
155. Id. at 281. 
156. Id. at 281–82. 
When Petschen traveled over the public streets he voluntarily conveyed to anyone 
who wanted to look the fact that he was traveling over particular roads in a 
particular direction, the fact of whatever stops he made, and the fact of his final 
destination when he exited from public roads onto private property. 
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281–82. 
157. Id. at 281–82. 
158. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 708 (1984). 
159. Id. 
160. Id. 
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number of locations, through the use of the beeper, the government agents 
finally discovered that the cans were at the house rented by the defendants.161  
The agents then obtained a warrant to search the house and subsequently 
discovered the defendants’ cocaine and laboratory paraphernalia.162  The 
defendants were consequently arrested and moved to suppress the evidence 
derived from the initial warrant to install the beeper.163 
After the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s decision to 
grant the defendant’s suppression of evidence, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari.164  The Court ultimately decided that although the defendant’s 
Fourth Amendment rights were not violated when the government installed 
the beeper on the ether can, the monitoring of the can when it was inside the 
defendant’s home was considered an unreasonable search.165  Unlike Knotts, 
as the Court noted, the beeper in Karo showed that it was inside the 
defendants’ home. 166  The Court furthermore held that the use of a beeper to 
track a person in his or her private residence that is not open to visual 
surveillance is considered a search within the Fourth Amendment.167 
Where exactly the beepers were broadcasting their precise location is 
the key difference between these two cases.168  The most significant question 
to ask when one is studying electronic surveillance cases is “what kind of 
information can be collected and whether that sort of information would be 
freely available to, say, a passerby?”169  Moreover, these two cases inevitably 
created a public/private distinction to evaluate the use of warrantless tracking 
devices and their potential Fourth Amendment implications.170 
                                            
161. Id. at 708–10. 
162. Id. at 710. 
163. Karo, 468 U.S. at 710.  “The [d]istrict [c]ourt granted respondents’ 
pretrial motion to suppress the evidence seized from the . . . residence on the grounds that the 
initial warrant to install the beeper was invalid and that the . . . seizure was the tainted fruit of 
an unauthorized installation and monitoring of that beeper.”  Id. 
164. Id. at 710–11. 
165. Id. at 713, 715. 
The monitoring of an electronic device such as a beeper is, of course, 
less intrusive than a full-scale search, but it does reveal a critical fact about the 
interior of the premises that the Government is extremely interested in knowing and 
that it could not have otherwise obtained without a warrant. 
Id. at 715. 
166. Karo, 468 U.S. at 710, 715; United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284–85 
(1983). 
167. Karo, 468 U.S. at 714. 
168. Malone, supra note 26, at 715. 
169. Id. at 716. 
170. Fox, supra note 42, at 782; see also Karo, 468 U.S. at 714; Knotts, 468 
U.S. at 284. 
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1. CSLI Differs from Beeper Cases 
Supporters of a warrant requirement for CSLI argue that the same 
analysis used in the beeper cases should be employed in CSLI cases.171  
Employing the same public/private analysis, however, would be 
superfluous.172 
[C]urrently CSLI is not consistently accurate enough to implicate 
the home of a suspect, but rather only indicates the general area 
where the call was made from, which may or may not give rise to 
the inference that the defendant was at home.  Knotts and Karo 
make clear that acquiring location information about an object in 
the vicinity of the home or other private space, but not within its 
interior, is not a search.173 
In addition, “historical CSLI does not convey information about the 
interior of a home.”174  Unlike the beeper cases that provide a precise 
location of the tracking device, historical CSLI typically only reveals the 
location of a cell phone within roughly 200 feet.175 
[T]he historical [CSLI] at issue identif[ies] only the closest cell[] 
tower to the Defendants’ phones, and not the precise location of 
the Defendants themselves. . . . Indeed, even with an ever-denser 
cell[] tower grid, such precision is impossible.  Moreover, even if 
cell site records could definitively indicate that an individual is in 
his home, that information only reveals that a person made or 
received a phone call while at home—in other words, non-
incriminatory information that is clearly obtainable via the 
constitutional pen register at issue in Smith v. Maryland.176 
                                            
171. Fox, supra note 42, at 789.  “Further, as CSLI becomes increasingly 
accurate, it will cause historical CSLI to fall under the ambit of Karo, as that information will 
allow law enforcement to determine if a suspect is in his or her home.”  Fraser, supra note 57, 
at 609; see also Karo, 468 U.S. at 714. 
172. See Fraser, supra note 57, at 611–12.  “The tracker beeper cases simply do 
not carry over well to a tracking device that has other uses; there is a need for a different 
distinction in CSLI analysis.”  Id. at 612. 
173. Id. at 609; see also Karo, 468 U.S. at 714; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285. 
174. Malone, supra note 26, at 737. 
175. Id.  “Unless a person is standing in the middle of a residence and the walls 
are 100 feet away in any direction, his historical CSLI will not be precise enough to prove that 
he is actually inside the walls of the residence and secluded from the public eye.”  Id. 
176. United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 404 (D. Md. 2012); see 
also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979); Malone, supra note 26, at 738.  “CSLI 
cannot indicate with certainty anything about the interior of a private residence.  Thus, the 
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Consequently, unlike the more precise tracking of a beeper, 
historical CSLI does not provide a precise location of a cell phone because 
the cell tower only gives an approximate location.177  Because historical 
CSLI substantially differs from beeper tracking, “CSLI falls outside of the 
traditional Fourth Amendment protections.  Accordingly, when a law 
enforcement agent uses voluntarily conveyed historical CSLI information to 
approximate a subscriber’s location, it does not constitute a Fourth 
Amendment search.”178 
D. United States v. Jones 
The most recent case that dealt with Fourth Amendment implications 
on tracking devices occurred in United States v. Jones.179  In Jones, the 
government secured a search warrant to install a GPS on a vehicle that was 
registered to the respondent’s wife.180  The government suspected the 
respondent of trafficking drugs through his nightclub and accordingly sought 
the warrant to allow the government to install the electronic tracking 
device.181  The warrant authorized the government to install and track the car 
in the District of Columbia for only ten days.182  Disobeying the terms of the 
warrant, the government installed the device in Maryland on the eleventh 
day.183  Signals from the device documented the vehicle’s location within 
roughly one hundred feet.184  With help from the tracking device, the 
government was able to obtain an indictment against the respondent and 
                                                                                                       
Fourth Amendment does not protect historical CSLI, and current law does not require a 
warrant or probable cause to obtain historical CSLI.”  Malone, supra note 26, at 738. 
177. Fox, supra note 42, at 789.  “This information does not provide the actual 
location of the cell phone because CSLI only gives the cell tower location used to carry a call 
and because location calculations based on cell towers give only an approximation of a 
subscriber’s phone’s location.”  Id. at 789. 
178. Id. at 790. 
If multiple cell sites record CSLI, the approximate location of the cell phone at the 
initiation of the call can be computed.  This approximate location, however, 
provides the general area of the caller, not the exact location.  A tracking beeper, on 
the other hand, can be traced to a precise location. . . . [H]istoric CSLI cannot show 
that a subscriber was at a particular place at a particular time; it can only show that 
the phone was in a general area. 
Id. at 789–90. 
179. United States v. Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Jan. 23, 2012). 
180. Id. at 1–2. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. at 2. 
183. Id. 
184. Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 2. 
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several of his co-conspirators, charging them with conspiracy to distribute 
cocaine.185 
Prior to trial, the respondent sought to suppress the evidence 
obtained from the GPS tracking, arguing that the installation and tracking of 
the GPS on the vehicle was an unreasonable search within the Fourth 
Amendment.186  The court, however, only suppressed the evidence obtained 
through the GPS while the vehicle was parked in the garage of the 
respondent’s house.187  Subsequently, the respondent was convicted at 
trial.188  The District of Columbia Circuit reversed the conviction on the 
grounds that the evidence acquired from the warrantless tracking of the GPS 
violated the Fourth Amendment.189 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the majority opinion, written by 
Justice Scalia, indicated that the case was primarily about the physical 
intrusion by the government onto private property for the sole purpose of 
obtaining evidence.190  “We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion 
would have been considered a search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment when it was adopted.”191  The Court, therefore, predominantly 
based its decision on the common law trespass doctrine.192  The physical 
trespass by the government to install the GPS device, outside the 
requirements set forth by the warrant, violated the respondent’s Fourth 
Amendment right against unreasonable searches.193 
1. Why Jones Analysis Does Not Apply 
The Eleventh Circuit in Davis erroneously applied the analysis set 
forth by the Supreme Court in Jones to arrive at its holding.194  Several 
reasons exist why the analysis set forth in Jones cannot be applied to 
historical CSLI cases.195 
                                            
185. Id. at 2–3. 
186. Id. at 2. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. at 3. 
189. Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op at 3. 
190. Id. at 4. 
191. Id. at 4. 
192. Id.  “The majority decided only that a search occurs when the government 
trespasses on an individual’s property for the purpose of gathering information.”  Rothstein, 
supra note 96, at 501. 
193. Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 1–3, 12. 
194. See id. at 3–4; United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1212, 1214 (11th 
Cir.), reh’g granted en banc, 573 F. App’x 925 (11th Cir. 2014). 
195. Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 3–4; Fraser, supra note 57, at 620. 
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First, the Eleventh Circuit indicated that GPS tracking and CSLI are 
analogous.196  As previously discussed, the tracking produced by a GPS and 
historical CSLI yield different levels of accuracy when determining an 
individual’s location.197  In Jones, the device was attached to a car, and the 
law enforcement agents tracked its movements in real-time.198  In Davis, 
however, the government did not track the suspects movements in real-time; 
the government simply obtained historical CSLI which does not track an 
individual’s precise real-time movements.199  “Historical cell site location 
data is, as its name implies, historical—the information revealed by such data 
exposes to the government only where a suspect was and not where he is.”200 
In addition, unlike Jones, the agents in Davis obtained records from 
the defendant’s cell phone carrier that only revealed the vicinity in which he 
made or received a cell phone call.201  And, unlike Jones, “this information 
can only reveal the general vicinity in which a cell[] phone is used.”202  The 
court even noted that “[w]e do not doubt that there may be a difference in 
precision, but that is not to say that the difference in precision has 
constitutional significance.”203  This argument is flawed because a person 
does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy to everything, and a 
person’s precise location is vital in determining whether their Fourth 
Amendment rights have been violated.204  Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit 
erred when it compared the tracking device employed in Jones to the 
historical CSLI employed in Davis.205 
Next, the analysis set forth in Jones cannot be applied to the Davis 
case because there was no trespass in Davis.206  Nevertheless, although the 
court addresses this factual distinction, it still used Jones to arrive at its 
decision.207 
[I]n the controversy before us there was no GPS device, no 
placement, and no physical trespass.  Therefore, although Jones 
clearly removes all doubt as to whether electronically transmitted 
                                            
196. Davis, 754 F.3d at 1213. 
197. See supra notes 172–78 and accompanying text. 
198. Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 2. 
199. Davis, 754 F.3d at 1210–11; see also Fraser, supra note 57, at 613–14. 
200. United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 391 (D. Md. 2012). 
201. Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 2; Davis, 754 F.3d at 1210–11; Graham, 
846 F. Supp. 2d at 392. 
202. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 392; see also Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 
2. 
203. Davis, 754 F.3d at 1216. 
204. See e.g., Fraser, supra note 57, at 609–13. 
205. See Davis, 754 F.3d at 1213–14, 1216; Fraser, supra note 57, at 613. 
206. Davis, 754 F.3d at 1214; see also Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 4. 
207. Davis, 754 F.3d at 1215; see also Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 12. 
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location information can be protected by the Fourth Amendment it 
is not determinative as to whether the information in this case is so 
protected.  The answer to that question is tied up with the 
emergence of the privacy theory of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence.  While Jones is not controlling, we reiterate that it is 
instructive.208 
Such an emphasis on the Supreme Court’s analysis set forth in Jones 
further demonstrates why the Eleventh Circuit got it wrong.209  Because the 
obtainment of one’s historical CSLI does not involve a physical trespass to 
one’s property, the Eleventh Circuit should not have employed the trespass 
theory to analyze the possible Fourth Amendment implications.210  Instead, 
the Eleventh Circuit should have employed the analysis set forth in Katz—to 
determine whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy that 
society was willing to accept as reasonable—to his CSLI.211 
E. Katz Analysis Applied to Davis 
If the Eleventh Circuit decided to instead employ the Katz analysis it 
would have found that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy.212  Conversely, even if the court found that the defendant had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, it would have found that society would 
not be willing to accept that expectation of privacy as reasonable because his 
location was voluntarily conveyed to the public through his cell phone 
provider.213 
The Eleventh Circuit stated that: 
[E]ven on a person’s first visit to a gynecologist, a psychiatrist, a 
bookie, or a priest, one may assume that the visit is private if it 
was not conducted in a public way.  One’s cell phone, unlike an 
automobile, can accompany its owner anywhere.  Thus, the 
                                            
208. Davis, 754 F.3d at 1214; see also Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 12. 
209. See Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 12; Fraser, supra note 57, at 620. 
 While it remains to be seen what the lasting effect of Jones will be, the 
Court’s narrow holding that the installation and use of the GPS device was a search 
provides little guidance on what the standard of proof should be to obtain historical 
CSLI records.  First, with respect to cell phones, the government does not have to 
install the devise used to generate location information—the user is already 
carrying around his or her cell phone. 
Fraser, supra note 57, at 620; see also Jones, No. 10-1259, slip op. at 12. 
210. United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 396 (D. Md. 2012). 
211. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967); see also Graham, 846 F. 
Supp. 2d at 396. 
212. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361; Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 396–401. 
213. See Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 398–99; Malone, supra note 26, at 733. 
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exposure of the [CSLI] can convert what would otherwise be a 
private event into a public one. . . . [CSLI] is private in nature 
rather than being public.214 
However, as previously indicated, “historical CSLI are the 
provider’s business records, and are not protected by the Fourth 
Amendment.”215  Because the defendant’s historical CSLI was retained by 
his cell phone provider within its ordinary course of business, the defendant 
had no expectation of privacy to those records and consequently his Fourth 
Amendment rights were not violated.216  Therefore, because the Eleventh 
Circuit disregarded the third party doctrine in arriving at its decision, it got it 
wrong when it comes to historical CSLI and the Fourth Amendment.217 
V. CONCLUSION 
Requiring a warrant each time law enforcement wishes to obtain 
historical CSLI would hinder the efforts of law enforcement and slow down 
their ability to investigate crimes.218  While society’s dependence on cell 
phones continues to grow and the government’s need to solve crimes 
continuously persists, a uniform standard to obtain historical CSLI needs to 
be addressed by Congress.219  However, as the Third Circuit articulated, it is 
not for the courts to decide what standard should be employed to obtain these 
records, but it is for Congress to decide.220  The Eleventh Circuit failed to 
follow its sister circuit in this regard.221 
As discussed at length, historical CSLI is not protected by the Fourth 
Amendment.222  The Stored Communications Act223 helps protect citizens 
and enables law enforcement to efficiently do their job.224  Because a cell 
phone user does not have a legitimate expectation to privacy to the records 
voluntarily conveyed to their cell phone provider, the Fourth Amendment is 
                                            
214. United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1216 (11th Cir.), reh’g granted en 
banc, 573 F. App’x 925 (11th Cir. 2014). 
215. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 398; see also U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
216. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 398; see also U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
217. See Davis, 754 F.3d at 1216–17; Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 398–400. 
218. Malone, supra note 26, at 744. 
219. Fox, supra note 42, at 792. 
220. In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. 
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 319 (3d Cir. 2010). 
221. Davis, 754 F.3d at 1216–17. 
222. See Fox, supra note 42, at 792. 
223. See generally Stored Communications Act § 201, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–
2710 (2012). 
224. Malone, supra note 26, at 745; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2703. 
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not implicated.225  The Eleventh Circuit failed to analyze Davis properly and 
consequently its decision was misguided.226 
After the submission of this Comment, the government filed a 
petition for rehearing en banc.227  With a majority of judges agreeing in favor 
of rehearing, the Eleventh Circuit ultimately vacated the Davis decision.228 
225. Malone, supra note 26, at 745. 
226. Davis, 754 F.3d at 1210; see also United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 
2d 384, 403 (D. Md. 2012); Fraser, supra note 57, at 613; Malone, supra note 26, at 745. 
227. See Davis, 754 F.3d at 1223. 
228. Id. 
25
Carlton: Why The Eleventh Circuit Got It Wrong: Historical Cell Site Locat
Published by NSUWorks, 2017
